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ORGANIZATIONAL AND INDIVIDUAL LEVEL ANTECEDENTS OF PROCEDURAL 
GOVERNANCE IN KNOWLEDGDE SHARING ALLIANCES 
1. Introduction  
Inter-organizational collaboration is an organizational form that is used by an increasing number of 
firms to meet a wide range of organizational aims (Hagedoorn 1996; 2002; Narula, 2004; Casson 
and Mol, 2006). Inter-organizational alliances are a preferred way of sourcing a variety of resources 
(Eisenhardt and Shonhoven, 1996; Gulati, 1999; Van de Ven and Walker, 1998), and a prominent 
view of the strategic alliance literature suggests that inter-firm collaboration has a special strength 
in serving as a mechanism by which a firm can leverage its skills, acquire new competencies, and 
learn (e.g. Kogut, 1989; Hamel, Doz, and Prahalad, 1989; Huber, 1991; Larsson, Bengtsson, 
Henriksson, and Sparks, 1998; Lyles, 1988; Powell and Brantley, 1992; Inkpen and Tsang, 2008). 
As firms collaborate at an increasing rate (Khanna et al, 1998) it becomes still more important to 
understand how these firms can be instrumental in organizing and governing the various 
collaborative knowledge processes that take place in alliances. 
In their quest to better understand the dynamics of strategic alliances, researchers have relied on 
numerous theories, including transaction cost economics, organizational learning, strategic 
behavior, options theory, resource-based theory, social exchange theory, institutional economics, 
and agency. Common for most of this research, however, very little attention has been directed to 
understanding how exactly firms may differ in their ability to succeed at collaborating. Although 
some researchers have pointed to the importance of prior experience (e.g., Lei and Slocum, 1992) in 
general and collaborative know-how in particular (e.g., Simonin, 1997; 2002), very little is known 
about the individual level preconditions of successful knowledge exchange in strategic alliances 
(Inkpen and Tsang, 2008; 2005). Indeed, while Simonin’s (1997; 2002) important work on 
collaborative know-how is among the most comprehensive attempts to isolate the knowledge and 
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learning components linked to collaboration (see also Lyles, 1988; Pisano, 1988), the focus is 
exclusively on identifying, mapping, and measuring firm level collaborative know-how.  
In this article we argue that in order to provide a better understanding of how valuable knowledge 
is successfully shared between alliance partners specific focus must be devoted to the role of 
procedural governance. Procedural governance refers to the structuring of the mutual knowledge 
flows between the partners in a given alliance. As such, procedural governance pertains to 
frequency, timing, directionality and means of knowledge flows ex post alliance formation and is 
concerned with how joint problem-solving is carried out. Previous research has distinguished 
between procedural and contractual inter-organizational coordination mechanisms (for a review, see 
Sobrero and Schrader, 1998). Contractual governance is concerned with the distribution of rights. 
The main vehicle for this kind of control is the alliance contract, which seeks to minimize disputes 
among partners and resolve these when they arise. The threat of legal recourse encourages parties to 
an alliance to perform their promises with a minimum of prompting and prodding, in order to avoid 
the costs of litigation or other modes of dispute resolution. As such, contractual governance is the 
essence of formal alliance formation as it defines the legal boundaries within which joint problem-
solving activities will occur. However, as noted by Kanter (2002), alliances “cannot be ‘controlled’ 
by formal systems but require a dense web of interpersonal connections and internal infrastructures 
that enhance learning” (Kanter 2002:100). This underlines the importance of continuous 
coordination of processes among parties, typically accomplished via mutual exchange and 
embeddedness of knowledge (Nielsen, 2005) through which the partners learn to adjust their 
activities to each other (Sobrero and Schrader, 1998: 590-591). This focus on effective multi-
directional knowledge flows between partners is the essence of procedural governance.  
We contribute to research on effective management of knowledge in alliances by proposing that 
(1) procedural governance is positively related to knowledge sharing in alliances, and (2) 
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antecedents of procedural governance are either individual or organizational in nature. Our main 
contention is that some of the core mechanisms fostering successful procedural governance may be 
individually held while others may be organizational in form. As Friedman and Podolny (1992) 
note, boundary spanners are more closely involved in the inter-organizational relationship than 
other members of the organization, and tend to interact with their counterparts to a greater extent. 
Hence, when examining the characteristics of an inter-organizational relationship, we need to study 
the individual and organizational levels simultaneously (Rousseau, 1985). In the eyes of some 
scholars, theory-driven research on multilevel phenomena is what “sets [this] field apart from its 
parent disciplines in that most of what we study in and about organizations are phenomena that are 
intrinsically mixed-level” (Rousseau, 1985: 2). In Gulati and Gargiulo’s view (1999), the social 
structure of interorganizational relations as a “macro” phenomenon emerges out of the “micro” 
decisions of organizations seeking to gain access to resources and to minimize the uncertainty 
associated with choosing alliance partners. 
It is worth noting that the majority of strategic alliance research is employing quantitative 
methods with a strong deterministic bias (Parkhe, 1993a; Doz, 1996). Assuming that alliances 
correspond to the implementation of clear-cut strategic objectives to be carried out via the alliance, 
most studies consider initial alliance conditions and partner characteristics as determinants of 
outcome (see Nielsen, 2007 for a review). However, it is likely that the requirements and 
antecedents of performance observed at one level of analysis (for instance the firm-level) are not 
consistent with those observed at other levels of analysis (for instance the individual or dyadic 
level). Hence, a more fruitful avenue for future strategic alliance research warrants an investigation 
of the nature and form of these cross-level interactions. Yet before we turn to the analysis of how 
the antecedents of procedural governance mechanisms span analytical levels we outline key 
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characteristics of the core activity that is at stake in this study, namely knowledge sharing in 
alliances. 
2. Sharing Knowledge: Creating Value through Alliances 
Knowledge sharing is understood as ‘a process in which an organization recreates and maintains a 
complex, causally ambiguous set of routines in a new setting’ (Szulanski, 2000:10). According to 
various scholars knowledge sharing has become a core activity in many firms as it contributes 
substantially to various desirable organizational outcomes, as for example new product 
development or dissemination of best practice across business units (Hansen, 1999; Szulanski, 
1996). The ability to share knowledge is often considered a source of competitive advantage for 
organizations (Arrow, 1974; Kogut and Zander, 1996). Hence, inter-organizational relationships 
have increasingly become a core component of strategy as they provide access to capabilities and 
resources that may otherwise be unavailable. The underlying logic for this argument lies in the view 
that organizations are heterogeneous entities that are differentially endowed with capabilities and 
important resources (Wernerfelt, 1984). Finding that a firm’s critical resources may span firm 
boundaries and may be embedded in inter-firm resources and routines, Dyer and Singh (1998; 
2004) developed a relational view of competitive advantage. They proposed the idea of relational 
rents, which is “…a supernormal profit jointly generated in an exchange relationship that cannot be 
generated by either firm in isolation and can only be created through the joint idiosyncratic 
contributions of the specific alliance partners” (Dyer and Singh, 2004: 351-352). Relational rents 
are determined by; inter alia, the degree of knowledge sharing between two firms. 
The literature has produced an impressive list of reasons for why organizations enter into an 
alliance, including categorizations such as “X form” and “Y form” coalitions (Porter and Fuller and 
1986), “scale” and “link” alliances (Hennart, 1988). Another general classification is “learning 
alliances”, where the objective is to learn and acquire from each other products, skills, and 
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knowledge (Lei and Slocum, 1992) and “business alliances”, intending to maximize the utilization 
of complementary assets (Harrigan, 1985). A review of this literature shows a strong similarity in 
the motives identified, ranging from risk/cost sharing via shaping of competition to institutional 
concerns with attaining legitimacy from the external environment. In relation to knowledge some 
authors argue that an alternative to the firm specific view of strategic renewal is to acquire new 
knowledge-related capabilities through strategic integration and mobilize it vis-à-vis the existing 
knowledge developing activities (e.g., Jemison, 1988). The strategic behavior perspective 
recognizes that sourcing knowledge externally is driven by long term competitive considerations 
and not only by minimization of transaction costs (Tidd and Trewhella, 1997). In addition scholars 
point to the fact that collaborative R&D projects are often set up with the aim of learning rather 
than minimizing cost (Hamel, 1991; Kogut, 1988; Grant, 1996). This illustrates that the acquisition 
of external knowledge or technology complements internal R&D rather than servings as a substitute 
for it (Tidd and Trewhella, 1997). Additionally, it highlights the importance of building and 
maintaining fruitful relations to core partners via close relations. In fact, supply chain management, 
an integrated approach to the planning and control of materials, services and knowledge flows from 
suppliers through factories to the end customer, represents one of the most significant paradigm 
shifts of modern business management by recognizing that individual businesses no longer 
compete as solely autonomous units, but rather as collaborative supply chains (Chen and Paulraj 
2004).         
In this vein Dyer and Singh (1998) has convincingly emphasized the importance of a firm’s 
investment in relation specific assets, their ability to engage in substantial knowledge exchange as 
well as the process of combining complementary but scarce resources. They also provide evidence 
for the importance of firms employing effective governance mechanisms that lower transaction 
costs in their quest for gaining relational rents. One of the specific factors that is leading to 
 6
relational rents is the development of knowledge sharing routines, defined as ‘a regular pattern of 
inter firm interactions that permits the transfer, recombination, or creation of specialized 
knowledge’ (Grant, 1996). These routines are institutionalized inter-firm processes that are 
purposefully designed to facilitate knowledge exchange between alliance partners (Dyer and Singh, 
1998), and the existence of knowledge sharing routines is suggested to be the factor that divides the 
successful collaborations from the less successful (Dyer and Hatch, 2006). The development and 
employment of these routines constitute a firm’s dynamic capabilities that is the ability to 
‘integrate, build and reconfigure internal and external competencies’ in rapidly changing 
environments (Teece et al, 1997), where the use of knowledge resources are especially critical 
(Grant, 1996).   
The character of the knowledge at stake in a given collaboration is very influential on a firm’s 
ability to make use of the knowledge (Dyer and Singh, 1998). A characteristic of knowledge is 
fostered by its degree of transferability: explicit knowledge can easily be communicated and hence 
is easily transferred between individuals, across space and time (Grant, 1996: 111). Tacit 
knowledge, on the other hand, is not articulated (codified) and thus more difficult to transfer. Tacit 
knowledge transfers more slowly across organizational borders than codified knowledge (Zander 
and Kogut, 1995). As allying is a preferred way of acquiring and creating knowledge in many firms 
(Katz and Allen, 1982; Ring and Van de Ven, 1994; Powel, Koput, and Smith-Doerr, 1996) a focus 
on inter-organizational knowledge sharing mechanisms supporting for example knowledge 
diffusion, information retrieval or shared problem solving, has proliferated in praxis as well as 
theory (Berends et al, 2006).  
Regardless of whether the motive for entering into a collaborative relationship is cost related, 
based on a wish for sharing resources, a need to learn new competences, or a combination, the 
success of the alliance relies on the ability to share knowledge across organizational borders and 
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contribute to new either local or joint knowledge production. However, inter-organizational 
knowledge sharing activities create various strategic issues to be handled (Contractor and Ra, 
2002). The dilemma of how much knowledge to disclose in the project (Carter, 1989), the difficulty 
of codifying and valuing knowledge (Tsoukas and Mylonopoulos, 2004), and the existence of 
various knowledge related asymmetries between partners (Dussage and Garette, 1995), are 
examples of challenges that meet a focal firm when entering into an inter-organizational 
collaborative project. This points to the importance of deploying deliberate governance mechanisms 
related to knowledge sharing in the alliance. Yet, contractual governance of knowledge sharing 
activities in an alliance is a less fertile approach to mitigate these challenges. This is so due to the 
often asymmetric distribution of knowledge combined with the tacitness of knowledge that prevents 
other individuals than those who possess the knowledge (that is the core employees, not the top 
managers) from taking part in the exchange. It is therefore important to ensure that the managers 
involved in the actual knowledge sharing activities are engaged in the contractual processes in order 
to ensure that the procedural governance mechanisms are not neglected. Additionally, contractual 
governance mechanisms are often only applied in the ex ante negotiation processes of the alliance 
formation process. Yet, in the later stages of alliance relationship development, ex post alliance 
formation, the need for explicit attention to design and implementation of procedural governance 
mechanisms pertaining to knowledge sharing arise. In order to avoid a disconnection of the ex ante 
alliance contractual negotiations and the ex post alliance coordination activities, these governance 
processes must be seen as two interrelated parts of the knowledge sharing activities. Furthermore, it 
is important to perceive the knowledge sharing activities as ongoing through the entire alliance 
relationship that is knowledge sharing is not only to be seen as an end product. As a result, 
procedural governance mechanisms are highly important during all phases of interfirm collaborative 
relationships and may serve as complements to more formal control systems, such as contracts. 
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.     
3. The Importance of Procedural Governance for Knowledge Sharing  
Contractual coordination mechanisms provide institutions for achieving the alignment of incentives 
among the partners. However, from the availability of these institutions, it is impossible to deduce 
how they are actually employed to coordinate the activities of the partners during the evolution of 
the relationship. Even if two organizations have contractually agreed on governing institutions for 
coordination at the outset of the alliance, it does not imply that these necessarily do coordinate their 
actions as the relationship matures (Sobrero and Schrader, 1998). Hence, a recurring criticism of the 
transaction cost literature as it has been applied to strategic alliance governance choice is that it fails 
to acknowledge the role that non-transactional attributes play in influencing the choice of 
governance mode. In particular, relational capital is suggested to be an important determinant of 
strategic alliance governance, where relational capital has been defined as encompassing mutual 
trust, respect, understanding and friendship between individuals in a business relationship (Thuy 
and Quang, 2005). Consistently, Doz, Hamel and Prahalad argue that the actual coordination is not 
achieved through contractual mechanisms but, rather, is realized by the day-to-day interaction of the 
employees involved in the activities of the relationship; ‘Top management puts together strategic 
alliances and sets the legal parameters for exchange. But what actually gets traded is determined by 
day-to-day interactions of engineers, marketers, and product developers’ (1989: 136).  
The study of strategic alliances has emphasized the use of transaction cost economics and 
resource dependence theories to explain the governance structure of alliances (Kogut, 1988; 
Contractor and Lorange, 1988). These theoretical formulations do not explicitly address the issue of 
new knowledge created in an alliance as they view alliances as just another form of organizing 
exchange. Other research has pointed out that effective alliance governance can significantly 
enhance firms’ joint learning and knowledge creation (e.g. Dutta & Weiss, 1997; Larsson et al., 
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1998). From a learning perspective, equity joint ventures are considered to be better suited than 
alternative governance mechanisms to the transfer and learning of tacit and embedded know-how 
because they align incentives for cooperation, permit a replication of the organizations themselves 
and provide prolonged and intense social interaction that facilitates the replication of organizational 
routines (Dutta & Weiss, 1997). Moreover, equity participation generates a governance structure in 
which companies can monitor the activities of the alliance as they are represented on the board of 
directors. Equity sharing might also align the motivation of the partners, thereby creating mutual 
interests that reduce the likelihood of opportunistic behavior by partners (Oxley, 1997; Pisano, 
1989).  
  Mjoen and Tallman (1997), on the other hand, argue that the relative degree of control of partners 
in a joint venture is determined by a bargaining process based on the importance of the resources 
that each partner contributes, rather than ownership level. Poppo and Zenger (2002) argue that the 
“right” mix of trust and formal contracting enhances cooperative interactions; however, they fail to 
specify precisely how this right mix is attained. To this end, some studies show that more complex 
alliances tend to be governed through more hierarchical forms, with the nature of complexity being 
identified by various measures including number of partners, scope of product and/or technology, 
nature of functional activities covered by the alliance, and technological intensity of industries (e.g. 
Oxley, 1997; Hagedoorn & Narula, 1996). Hence, while promising, research in this area has not 
sufficiently demonstrated that alliances influence the development of new knowledge-related 
resources nor has it identified the conditions under which such development occurs. 
Network theory argues that embeddedness shifts actor’s motivation away from the narrow pursuit 
of immediate economic gains toward the enrichment of relationships through trust and reciprocity 
(Powell, 1990; Smitka, 1991). According to Uzzi (1999), governance arrangements of social 
embeddedness appear to come before, rather than follow from, the attributes of transactions. 
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Following this, embeddedness is not a result of an exchange relationship; rather it preexists and 
shapes exchange relationships. This indicates the existence of an important underlying latent 
construct, procedural governance, which needs to be explicitly recognized and integrated in the 
explanation of knowledge sharing in strategic alliances.  
Decisions on the frequency, timing and directionality of knowledge flows, as well as the means 
through which these flows occur (e.g., cross-functional team, alliance unit or simply a knowledge 
management system), identify the operational dimensions of procedural coordination mechanisms. 
The purpose of procedural coordination is that actors exchange sufficient information so that they 
can adjust their mutual behavior in a meaningful way for any given associated distribution of rights 
among the partners. The degree to which parties can achieve procedural coordination will influence 
the patterns of knowledge exchange between partners to an alliance. It is likely that the nature of the 
tasks to be carried out during the alliance relationship will influence the expected outcome. 
Furthermore, the nature of tasks is likely to change constantly during the course of the alliance 
relationship and thus procedural coordination mechanisms will have to be adjusted accordingly. 
Maintaining the relational quality after the contract has been signed is an important activity 
positively related to performance (Büchel and Killing, 2002). Above all it is important to constantly 
consider how the procedural coordination mechanisms need to be adjusted in order to facilitate the 
knowledge sharing activities of the alliance. Notwithstanding, the level and quality of procedural 
governance in collaborative exchange relations is likely to influence the degree of knowledge 
sharing among alliance partners in the following general way: 
Proposition 0: Procedural governance is positively related to knowledge sharing in 
strategic alliances. 
Multiple factors determine the level and quality of procedural governance in strategic alliance 
relationships. As postulated in figure 1 below, several capability factors at different analytical levels 
 11
are hypothesized to affect the level and quality of procedural governance in an alliance. At the 
organizational level, variables associated with strategy and processes, are likely to influence the 
way the alliance is procedurally governed. At the individual level, variables associated with 
willingness and skills among employees involved in the exchange relationship are of primary 
importance. While the individual importance of most of these variables has long been recognized in 
both strategic alliance and social exchange literatures, their simultaneous effects have thus far been 
ignored. As noted by Inkpen (2002), now that a solid base of antecedent research exists, the next 
step is theoretical and empirical work that integrates the diverse categories1 and establishes some 
causal links across the variables. In line with this observation, we go one step further and introduce 
cross-level effects in order to fully account for the complexity of knowledge sharing in strategic 
alliances. Thus, the aim of this paper is to identify the multi-level determinants of procedural 
governance, and how they relate to knowledge sharing, in strategic alliances, and derive a series of 
testable propositions to guide future empirical investigation.  
 
----------------------------------- 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
----------------------------------- 
 
4. The Antecedents of Procedural Governance 
We have indicated that the antecedents are either organizational or individual in nature. A central 
reason for the importance of dealing with the individual-level antecedents of procedural governance 
                                                 
1 According to Inkpen (2002), antecedents of alliance learning can be classified into five categories: (1) learning partner 
characteristics, (2) teaching partner characteristics, (3) knowledge characteristics, (4) relationship factors, and (5) 
alliance form. In the model presented in this article, category 1 and 2 are collapsed and included together with 3 and 
4.Alliance form is considered a control variable for testing purposes. 
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mechanisms is that they are necessary for providing a complete understanding of the 
organizational-level phenomenon that we study, i.e., procedural governance (Coleman, 1990; Abel, 
Felin and Foss, 2007). Adding individual-level antecedents to the organizational level antecedents 
accomplishes at least three things: First of all, it enables us to delineate the various alternative 
individual-level explanations that can not be disentangled in an organizational-level explanation. 
Second, it provides an opportunity to be precise about prospective managerial interventions as we 
deal with the need for interventions at the level where they ought to be directed that is  at the level 
of individual action. Third, since the phenomena we study are likely to be an outcome of the action 
of their components (for example the behavior of individuals of a given strategic alliance), 
knowledge of how the actions of these parts combine to produce the collective level outcome can be 
expected to give greater predictability than will aggregate relations of surface characteristics of the 
system. In other words, “an explanation based on internal analysis of system behavior in terms of 
actions and orientations of lower level units is likely to be more stable and general than an 
explanation which remains at the system level” (Coleman, 1990:3).  In this context it is particularly 
important to note that it is not the explanations of the individual level antecedents as such that 
interests us; rather it is the understanding of the interaction between the individual and the 
organizational level antecedents which is essential. This interaction, being for example the way that 
individual alliance capabilities support organizational level collaborative initiatives, must be 
brought into focus as it will assist in providing both a better theoretical understanding of the 
construct of procedural governance and a productive ground for outlining potential managerial 
implications.                
4.1 Organizational level Antecedents of Procedural Governance   
The relational capability of a firm – i.e. its capability to interact with other companies – may 
increase its access to external knowledge and potentially increase knowledge transfer (Lorenzoni 
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and Lipparini, 1999). Both transaction and production costs can be lowered through multiple, 
repeated, trust-based relationships, and well managed alliances are likely to support a firm’s access 
to complementary capabilities and specialized knowledge (Lorenzoni and Lipparini, 1999). At the 
organizational level it is important that the organizational strategy supports the development of 
procedural governance mechanisms. The strategic antecedents of procedural governance 
mechanisms are associated with anchoring the alliance strategy within the overall organizational 
strategy, for example, by fostering routines that assess the task-related and partner-related fit 
(Geringer, 1991) in relation to the strategic objectives. Other examples are post-alliance formation 
routines pertaining to speed of knowledge transfer and development of effective ways to capture 
synergies among complex, dispersed knowledge-related resources (e.g. via rotation of scientists or 
joint reward systems).  
At the same time some structural elements are likely to affect procedural governance. These 
structural elements pertain to developing effective practices for procedures that allow for 
standardization of knowledge sharing, such as designing IT infrastructures and setting up 
communication channels for the interaction between partners. Another example is the establishment 
of an alliance unit that facilitates the technical aspects of the interaction, which may significantly 
reduce the cost of setting up, monitoring and managing an alliance (Simonin, 1997; 2002). By the 
same token, the important role of the alliance manager as a coordinating devise in collaborative 
relationships is widely accepted (Spekman et al., 1998). For instance, Draulans, deMan and 
Volberda (2003) found that organisations with a specialist, positioned at middle-to lower levels of 
management, are considerably more successful with alliances than those lacking one. Moreover, the 
design of a specific knowledge management system, organized around the content and complexity 
of knowledge to be shared in conjunction with organizational structural characteristics (Nielsen and 
Michailova, 2007), ensures effective knowledge sharing across organizational boundaries. Hence, 
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to the extent that the organizational strategy-structure configuration is aligned with knowledge 
sharing intent, we would expect the following: 
 
Proposition 1: Strategies and structures that are aligned with knowledge sharing intent are 
positively related to procedural governance in strategic alliances. 
 
The organizational level governance mechanisms are often closely related or formed by the 
culture or climate of the organization. Organizational culture is believed to be the most significant 
input to effective knowledge management and organizational learning. Corporate culture 
determines values, beliefs, and ultimately work systems that may encourage or impede coordination 
of knowledge sharing efforts (e.g., Alavi and Leidner, 2001; Leonard-Barton, 1995). The 
importance of a knowledge-centered organizational culture which supports knowledge exchange 
and accessibility is evident (Janz and Prasarnphanich, 2003). Nevertheless, within the field of 
knowledge management, relatively little research has been conceptually and empirically conducted 
that seeks to identify what constitutes a knowledge-centered culture – that is which key 
organizational characteristics encourage and facilitate both the creation and dissemination of 
knowledge. Moreover, although the importance of socialization, face-to-face relationships, 
embeddedness, and cooperative interaction among individuals for the purpose of knowledge sharing 
is well established (e.g., Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995; Senge, 1990), relatively little is known about 
the influence of a collaborative climate on knowledge management in strategic alliances. 
A collaborative climate is best defined as the observable behavior in regards to collaboration in a 
given group; or put more colloquially it can be said to be ‘what people do around here’ (Sveiby and 
Simens, 2002:421). On the basis of a large scale theoretical study, Sveiby and Simens (2002) 
developed a categorization of how the composition of collaborate climate can be understood. Three 
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of the components are organizational level issues, such as fostering employee collaborative attitude; 
work group knowledge sharing support; and organizational culture, relating to the leadership 
factors outside the specific alliance group. We propose that collaborative climate is an important 
prerequisite to drive a propensity for high knowledge sharing because such a climate form the 
organization’s retentive and nurturing capacity. Organizations with a collaborative climate are 
typically equipped with an extensive set of routines and learning competencies designed to retain 
and nurture knowledge transferred from an alliance partner. This is consistent with 
(inter)organizational learning theory (Levitt and March, 1988; Huber, 1991), which is preoccupied 
with how learning processes can be structured or enabled, given the nature of the knowledge to be 
learned. The process approach to corporate coherence allows firms to solve the coordination of 
knowledge dispersal ‘by various means, such as command, management information systems, 
routines and shared cognitive constructs’ (Foss and Christensen, 2001, p. 222). Hence, collaborate 
climate and development of (inter)organizational learning processes are likely to be conducive to 
coordination of alliance knowledge management activities and thus constitutes the very bedrock 
upon which governance rests. Hence: 
 
Proposition 2: A collaborate climate and organizational learning processes are positively 
related to procedural governance in strategic alliances. 
4.2 Individual level Antecedents of Procedural Governance  
Discussions in existing organizational literatures lack attention to levels in general and micro-
foundations in particular (for a discussion see Felin and Foss, 2005; Dansereau et al., 1999). 
Despite the growing use of collaborative alliances in a wide variety of settings, much of the 
organizational literature still treats the organization as the centerpiece of theorizing. Various studies 
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have examined the acquisition of capabilities and knowledge through alliances (e.g. Inkpen and 
Dinur, 1998; Inkpen and Pien, 2006; Kale et al., 2000; Tsang, 2002). However, the vast majority of 
these studies have the organization or the alliance (dyad) as the unit of analysis, thereby lacking 
attention to individual level antecedents of knowledge sharing. The application of diverse 
theoretical approaches, such as resource dependence theory, microeconomics and strategic 
management, identify specific (industry or firm-level) preconditions for collaboration and use these 
to predict organizational outcomes, however, without regard to the underlying, individual level 
mechanisms that conditions these outcomes. Although studies have recognized the importance of 
individuals for alliances and learning more generally, few studies have incorporated the role of 
individuals into explanations for knowledge sharing in alliances. Research has found that the bonds 
between key individuals are central mechanisms that initiate alliance formation (e.g. Larson, 1992) 
and sustain inter-firm relationships (Seabright, Levinthal and Fichman, 1992). Individuals also 
embody the knowledge-based resources that evoke problem solving and learning and contribute the 
most to a firm’s ability to utilize information (Allen, 1977; Simon, 1985). Moreover, the primary 
basis of the firm’s ability to capitalize on external information rests on the ability of individuals to 
access, assimilate and utilize information (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990: 131). Despite these insights, 
researchers of strategic alliances have placed much greater emphasis on environmental conditions, 
and organizational level resources, practices and tendencies than individual level mechanisms as 
explanations for knowledge sharing in alliances.  
We argue that by redirecting the focus towards the individual level mechanisms that condition 
knowledge sharing we provide a more solid analysis based on knowledge about how the actions and 
abilities of the individuals impinge on organizational level outcome. We concur with Leung and 
White who state that, ‘so much is at stake in an alliance, as reflected by the voluminous firm-level 
research on this topic, but we know so little about the relevant people issues that make or break 
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alliances’ (Leung and White 2006: 203). Challenges may crop up due to conflicting ideas about 
how and when to collaborate or because the individuals’ abilities do not match the task. Other 
challenges may stem from in-group favoritism (Salk and Shenkar, 2001) or divergent perception of 
group members (Leung and White, 2006).  
Realizing the importance of the individual’s knowledge sharing behavior we turn towards the 
issue of work motivation, which can be defined as the set of psychological processes that initiate 
work related behavior and determine its form, direction, intensity, arousal, and duration (Latham 
and Pinder, 2005; Mitchel, 1982). Motivation is an invisible, internal, hypothetical construct 
(Ambrose and Kulik, 1999) which is affected by external factors such as rewards, punishment, 
rules, norms etc. and internal factors such as needs, values, cognition etc. Whether employees are 
willing to engage in collaborative projects is an outcome of their motivational orientation; they may 
collaborate because they are rewarded for this specific effort or they may collaborate when the 
opportunity arises because they find collaborative activities more interesting than the ordinary tasks 
they otherwise would have done—or as a mix of the two. People that are intrinsically motivated to 
engage in collaboration (due to e.g. personal beliefs or traits) may be specifically chosen to be a part 
of a given collaborative project. In this way the manager can design a group of people for a given 
collaborative project that are especially keen on collaborating.    
It is especially important to focus on the employees’ willingness to collaborate as not all 
employees see the potential gains of collaboration at first sight. Certain individuals may be opposed 
to collaboration for numerous reasons which may give rise to an attitude mirrored in the ‘not 
invented here’-syndrome (NIH). According to the NIH-syndrome employees traditionally resist 
accepting knowledge produced externally, and favor internal solutions to a given problem even 
though external solutions do exist (Katz and Allen, 1982). Various kinds of knowledge hoarding 
behaviors may lead to rejection of knowledge sharing. The term ‘hoarding’ suggests a premeditated 
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attempt to hide something away for own future use, yet a hoarding behavior may also be the result 
of an unconscious attitude. Conscious or unconscious, people hold back their knowledge if they 
anticipate to be punished for sharing it, in one way or another. An employee may, by way of 
example, fear to be blamed if she shares knowledge with a partner and what is shared is misused by 
the partner. Additionally she may be anxious about loosing her status; if she shares her knowledge 
there will be no need for his expertise any longer and he may not even be recognized for his 
contribution. These factors may all lead to behavioral barriers to collaboration. Thus, to the extent 
individuals are motivated and willing to collaborate, coordination of knowledge related activities in 
strategic alliances is likely to improve:   
 
Proposition 3: Individual collaborative intent/willingness is positively related to procedural 
governance in strategic alliances. 
 
Whereas behavioral barriers to collaboration may be rooted in lack of motivation, cognitive barriers 
are typically related to the absence of ability to share or collaborate. For instance, lack of ability to 
articulate the required knowledge or incapability of understanding the context in which the 
knowledge is to be applied may constitute cognitive barriers to coordination and transfer of 
knowledge. An employee’s wide range of abilities is a very important condition for his or her 
behavior in a collaborative project. The most central abilities that are needed in a given 
collaborative project are, naturally, the ones related to the task that is to be carried out in the 
collaborative project. The extent to which an individual understands a specific domain of 
knowledge defines whether he is an expert in this area. Individuals with a high level of expertise are 
better at understanding the laws, logic and rationales underlying the function or processes of a 
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specific knowledge domain. This understanding provides the individual with the ability to identify 
critical configurations or complexes that contains several pieces of information such as information 
about the solution in a complex situation (Lofstrom, 2000, Camerer and Johnson, 1991). Individuals 
who are experts are better at integrating new knowledge in existing domains than individual without 
expertise, and as a consequence individuals with high level of expertise are more likely to learn 
from collaborative activities. Thus, by way of example, a project about developing answers to 
challenges in the field of cancer research will be better off if a number of oncologists are core 
members of the collaborative group. In staffing collaborative project the manager need to keep the 
central knowledge in focus and assign employees that hold the right expertise. Still, employees with 
other professional profiles will also be needed. A collaborative project will most often need a legal 
officer (or a patent worker) closely connected to the project as well as inclusion of employees from 
other functional areas, such as business development or marketing. 
In addition to possessing the proper disciplinary skills employees may benefit from additional 
skills that are directed towards the specific challenges pertaining to collaborating as such. An ability 
to designate and understand the various phases of a collaborative project and to spot the potential 
problems that may occur at a given time in the project may be beneficial to employees engaged in 
alliances. Firms that collaborate frequently tend to make this kind of knowledge explicit in manuals 
or a codex that can guide the employees through the phases of the project. Still, the ability to 
maneuver skillfully is often a question of experience and may thus be a personally held ability. 
Abilities that relate to understanding and aligning to the partner’s goals or being good at working in 
trans-disciplinary teams are often gained through experience. This goes for many of the individual 
capabilities which can be characterized as collaborative capabilities, such as interpersonal 
communication skills. An important ability in regards to procedural governance is the ability to 
absorb external knowledge. In fact, one of the most important learning processes in collaborations 
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is the process of recognizing the value of new, external information, assimilating it and applying it 
to commercial ends in the firm. Essentially, the skills and abilities associated with appropriation and 
utilization of external knowledge are central individual capabilities for employees engaged in 
collaborative projects. 
 
Proposition 4: Individual collaborative skills/abilities are positively related to procedural 
governance in strategic alliances. 
 
5. Conclusion: The Interaction of Organizational and Individual Level 
Antecedents   
The dominant rationale behind the increase in strategic interfirm collaboration is that firms engaged 
in alliances can enjoy synergistic effects by combining knowledge resources and related capabilities 
(Doz and Hamel, 1998; Ring and Van de Ven, 1994; Powel, Koput and Smith-Doerr, 1996; 
Contractor and Lorange, 2004; Bamford, et al 2003), and that they additionally can foster 
opportunities to learn, and to access knowledge that can then be shared and used to create 
innovative solutions (Grant and Baden-Fuller, 2004). Yet as we have argued knowledge sharing 
must be supported by the implementation of procedural governance mechanisms that are directed 
towards the structuring of mutual knowledge flows. We have shown that procedural governance in 
strategic alliances is positively affected by a number of factors of which some are organizational 
and some are individual in nature. Although the identification and specification of these factors are 
important, it is the interaction between levels that exposes the true complexity of knowledge 
sharing and governance in strategic alliances. Only by studying the combined effects of 
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organizational and individual level antecedents of procedural governance can we arrive at an 
understanding of how to facilitate more effective interorganizational knowledge sharing. 
Since knowledge ultimately resides within the individual and collaboration is a result of inter-
personal socialized interaction, we argue that a strategic view on collaborations needs to be 
accompanied by a more fine-grained analysis of the individual level perceptions and behaviors that 
affect the various collaborative activities of a given firm. As is clear from the above discussion, 
organizational strategies and structures, as well as cultural processes, form the preconditions for 
procedural governance and interorganizational knowledge sharing. However, organizational 
conditional factors, such as for instance governing policies for knowledge transfer or application of 
incentive systems designed to encourage collaborative behaviors, do not ensure effective 
coordination of knowledge related activities in strategic alliances. The extent, to which such 
organizational level collaborative capabilities enhance procedural governance, and ultimately 
collaborative knowledge sharing, is likely to vary widely with the behavioral and cognitive 
characteristics of the individuals involved in a collaborative agreement:  
 
Proposition 5:  Organizational-level and individual-level antecedents exhibit interactive 
effects on procedural governance in strategic alliances. 
 
In this paper, we have argued that procedural governance is formed by the interplay between 
strategic and structural resources at the organizational level and willingness and abilities at the 
individual level. This puts a premium on studies that distinguish between factors at the 
organizational and individual level which may influence procedural governance, as well as the 
potential moderating effects of one level on the other. The proposed framework leads to several 
propositions that may guide future research in the pursuit of a more complete understanding of the 
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interdependent roles of organizational-level and individual-level antecedents of procedural 
governance in strategic alliances. It may also provide strategic decision makers with a better 
framework for evaluating the potential tradeoff or substitution effects of different types of 
coordinating mechanisms.  
In many organizations, the group initiating inter-firm relationships and involved in the drafting 
of the original contracts is quite different from the group in charge of the implementation of the 
agreement. The contractual coordination mechanisms are frequently negotiated by top-management 
and a group of lawyers, while the setting up of procedural coordination is left to business-unit 
managers, who have usually been involved in similar alliances in the past. Whenever such 
functional separation is not carefully bridged, however, the negotiation and the implementation 
aspects of inter-firm relations are de facto detached, increasing the chances that the relationship will 
fail. Hence, from a managerial perspective, it is important to recognize the interactive effects of 
organizational strategic policies and individual level human resource management issues. For 
instance, organizations that engage frequently in collaborative projects and where a large part of 
company revenues accrues from strategic alliances should invest resources not only in building 
organizational structures and processes that may facilitate more effective collaboration and 
knowledge sharing, but also devote adequate attention to hiring and further training individuals with 
behavioral and cognitive characteristics conducive to interfirm knowledge sharing.   
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